Greg Detre
Monday, 29 May, 2000
Prof. Tasioulas
Week V, Tutorial VI
the first question for philosophy is not:
�Do you agree with utilitarianism�s answer?�
but
�Do you really accept utilitarianism�s way of looking at the question?�
Smart�s utilitarianism = consequentialist, eudaimonistic and direct
consequentialism = doctrine that the moral value of any action always lies in its consequences
and that it is by reference to their consequences that actions, and indeed such things as institutions, laws and practices, are to be justified if they can be justified at all
eudaimonistic = that what it regards as the desirable feature of actions is that they should increase or maximise people�s happiness (or utility)
as distinguished from certain other goods at which (according to some consequentialists), it is independently worth aiming our actions
the preferred value is pleasure
or satisfaction
in talking of happiness or utility, one is talking about peoples� desires or preferences and their getting what they want or prefer, rather than about some sensations of pleasure or happiness
ideal utilitarianism = forms of consequentialism not exclusively concerned with happiness
direct = the conseuqential value which is the concern of morality is attached directly to particular actions, rather than to rules or practices (or dispositions???) under which decisions are taken without further reference to consequences (which = indirect utilitarianism; i.e. act vs rule)
the distinction between direct/indirect utilitarianism is important because it�s a question of the point of utilitarianism
utilitarianism cannot hope to make sense, at any serious level, of integrity
because it can make only the most superficial sense of human desire and action at all
and hence only very poor sense of what was supposed to be its own speciality, happiness
perhaps: everything that has value in it (whatever category), in virtue of its consequences
but: no one can hold that consequences are what determines the value of everything
since it would �/span> hopeless regress
even if:
it is not really the supposed end, but the effort towards it on which we set value
i.e.� we don�t travel to arrive, but we choose somewhere to arrive, in order to travel
because even then: not everything would have consequential value
travelling would have non-consequential value, rather than the destination
then presumably: some types of thing have non-consequential value
and some particular things, because they are instances of those types
= intrinsic value
in consequentialism: the only kind of thing that has intrinsic value = states of affairs
\ anything else that has value, has it because it conduces some intrinsically valuable state of affairs
but �state of affairs� seems too inclusive
e.g. opposing Kantianism can be seen as a kind of consequentialism which identifies the states of affirs that have intrinsic (moral) value as those that consist of actions being performed for duty�s sake
need to contrast states of affairs with other candidates for having such value
(especially actions)
perhaps: distinguishing mark of consequentialism is that it always regards the value of actions as consequential (i.e. derivative vs intrinsic)
the value of actions �/span> in their causal properties
but perhaps: some actions might have intrinsic value?
if: happiness/pleasure = experiences or sensations which were related to actions + activity as effect to cause
then utilitarianism: the value of all action is derivative
and only experiences of happiness are intrinsically valuable
inadequate because:
if actions/activities are pleasant or make you happy, that is not say that they always induce certain sensations in you
but that you enjoy them for their own sake
satisfaction = the activites which a man will freely choose to engage in
will be excluded in a consequentialism which debars action from having intrinsic value
2 accounts of consequentialism: either too generous or too restrictive, depending on whether you wholly include or exclude actions among desirable states of affairs
need to look at the interrelations between states of affairs and actions
right action for an agent in given circumstances:
in act utilitarianism = of the actions available to the agent, brings about/represents the highest degree of whatever it is the system in questions regards as intrinsically valuable,
i.e. in utilitarianism = maximises happiness
direct utilitarianism maximising/minimising of the good/bad is an objective notion
i.e. it�s possible for an agent to be (non-culpably) ignorant/mistaken about the right action
i.e.even if it�s the subjectively right action
but if an agent is unaware/misinformed about certain actions, can they really be said to be �available� to him?
perhaps restrict available to: physically able to perform and culturally or psychologically predisposed to think of
but not: �also properly informed about�
right decision for an agent = doing the best of the alternatives available to him
in virtue of its causal properties (maximally conducing to good states of affairs)
difficulties of distinguishing consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories
� action A in situation S etc.
non-consequentalist is concerned with right actions (e.g. fulfilling promises), btu hay have no general way of comparing states of affairs from a moral point of view at all
utilitarianism/consequentialism emphasises this necessary comparability of situations
what if a non-consequentialist were to admit comparison between states of affairs?
if the goodness of the world were to consist in people�s fulfilling their obligations, it would by no menas follow that one of my obligations was to bring it about that other people kept their obligations
denial of consequentialism: with respect to some type of action, there are some situations in which it would be the right thing to do, even though the state of affairs produced by one�s doing it would be worse than some other state of affairs accessible to one
actions that are right whatever the consequences
in social + psychological fact, there is no difference between non + consequentialism:
�absolutely right� action � can mean either that no type of action is right-whatever-its-consequences, or alternatively, that �it all depends on the consequences�
once you stop thinking of certain actions as �absolutely out�, then inhibitions abou thinking of everything in consequential terms disappears: the exceptional-usual becomes simply greater-less
unthinkable (moral category) vs monstrous possible alternatives
rationality = a demand not merely on him, but on the situations in/about which he has to think
consequentialist rationality has no such limitations � indeed, making the best of a bad job is one of its maxims
consequentialism is indifferent to whether a state of affairs consists in what I do, or is produced by what I do
all causal connections are on the same level (i.e. it doesn�t matter if someone else�s action is the link to an eventual outcome � obviously the effect on their utility will be included in the calculation of the resulting state of affairs)
negative responsibility in consequentialism = if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for things that I myself directly (everyday sense) bring about
those things must enter the deliberation of a responsible moral agent on the same footing
= special application of the principle of impartiality (the essence of morality?)
there is no relevant difference from a moral point of view which consists just in the fact that benefits or harms accrue to one person rather to another
�it�s me� can never in itself be a morally comprehensible reason
abstracts from the identity of the agent, leaving just a locus of casal intervention in the world
in moral philosophy tend to beg important questions:
they arbitrarily cut off + restrict the range of alternative courses of action
and they present the situation as a going concern (ignore how the agent got into it)
George: Needs work as a chemist. Is offered a job in chemical/biological weapons research � if he doesn�t take it, someone more enthusiastic will.
Jim: 20 tribesmen are to be shot. Jim is offered the privilege of shooting just one, in which case the other 19 will be set free.
utilitarianism � thinks that the obviously right answers are:
George should accept the job and Jim should kill the Indian
but the answers seem perhaps neither right nor obvious
ignores the idea that each of us is specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other peope do
this is closely connected with the value of integrity
which direct utilitarianism seems to make unintelligible
because it cannot coherently describe the relations between a man�s projects and his actions
two types of effect often invoked by utilitarians:
how will George/Jim be after they have chosen a course?
perhaps the utilitarian-seeming course will have bad enough effects to cancel out the initial utilitarian advantages
confusion � e.g. if the agent feels bad, because he thinks that he has done the wrong thing
such feelings should not be encouraged or given much/any weight
especially in the case of Jim, where his feelings seem to be of little weight compared with other things at stake
self-indulgent squeamishness vs 19 deaths
there is an appeal that there is something dishonourable about such self-indulgence
all it can do is to invite one to consider (from a utilitarian point of view) how seriously, and for what reasons, one feels that what one is invited to do is (in these circumstances) wrong
we cannot regard our moral feelings merely as objects of utilitarian value
because our moral relation to the world is partly given by such feelings, and by a sense of what we can/cannot �live with�
coming to regard those feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view (as happenings outside one�s moral self) is to lose a sense of one�s moral identity; to lose, in the most literal way, one�s integrity
utilitarianism is alienating one from one�s moral feelings (and actions)
if we were to regard our moral feelings from a strictly utilitarian point of view, Jim should give very little weight to his at all
in George�s case, things are slightly different � George�s wife has some reason to be interested in George�s integrity, while the Indians have no interest in Jim�s
strong argument: a strict utilitarian should give no weight at all to feelings of this kind in calculations of right + wrong
if, before taking these feelings into account, a course of action is utilitarianly preferable, then bad feelings about that kind of action are irrational from a utilitarian point of view
though utilitarianism might try to take into account all feelings, incl irrational ones, �/span> unacceptable/self-defeating results:
racial minority whom the majority want to be rid of
if the majority are very severely uncomfortable, and it�s a very small minority
then a utilitarian calculation might favour their removal
if the majority are unpleasant to the minority, a utilitarian might wonder whether the unpleasant experiences of the prejudiced people should be allowed, merely as such, to count
but it�s problematic if he does count them
since a rational utilitarian would discount them in himself
and so he should discount them in his calculations about society
Burke: this effect can be important:
that one morally can do what someone has actually done, is a psychologically effective principle, if not a deontically valid one
the effect depends on some conditions, e.g. the publicity of the act and the status of the agent
in order for the precedent effect to make a difference to a utilitarian calculation, it must be based on a confusion
suppose there is an act that is best in the circumstances, but would encourage by precedent other people to do things which will not be the best things to do
the situations of those other people must be relevantly different
but if so, then it must be a confused perception which takes the first situation as an adequate precedent for the second
but just because it�s based on a confusion, does not mean that it is not real and should be discounted
it emphasises that calculation of the precedent effect have to be realistic, involving considerations of how people are actually likely to be influenced
inapplicable to considerations of George and Jim�s cases
both examples: if the agent does not do a certain disagreeable thing, someone else will, and the state of affairs will be even worse than if the agent had done it
strong doctrine of negative responsibility inherent in consequentialism:
if I know that if I do X, O1 will eventuate
and if I refrain from doing X, O2 will
O2 is worse than O1
then I am responsible for O2 if I refrain voluntarily from doing X
(�you could have prevented it�)
if Jim refrains from action:
it�s not just that this occurs: 20 Indians are dead
but that this occurs: Pedro�s
killing twenty Indians
and that this is not a result which Pedro brings about, though the death of the Indians is
what one does is not included in the outcome of what one does,
while what another does can be included in the outcome of what one does
only a weak condition has to be satisfied:
for Pedro�s killing the Indians to be the outcome of Jim�s refusal, it only has to be causally true that if Jim had not refused, Pedro would not have done it
therefore Jim is responsible (in some sense) for that outcome
but we can�t say that Jim made those things happen (Pedro would be lying if he said �You leave me no alternative�)
you can�t leave Pedro out of the picture in his essential role as an agent (one who has intentions and projects)
criticise the notion of negative responsibility from the direction of:
the effects of Pedro�s projects on Jim�s decision
can also criticise on the basis of:
the basic moral relevance of distinguishing between action/inaction
is significant, but unclear/blurs
boundless obligation + roles � but Jim can�t say that it�s none of his business
what projects does a utilitarian agent have?
general project of bringing about maximally desirable outcomes (which depends on which causal levers are within reach)
but there need to be lower-order projects (desire for things for oneself, family, necessities of life, objects of taste, intellectual + cultural pursuits etc.)
the desirable outcomes consist of the maximally harmonious realisation of those projects
wants to avoid the �churchy� division into higher pleasures
do you include higher-order projects (general dispositions towards human conduct + character, e.g. hatred of injustice or cruelty)?
if not, then you�re committed to a superficial + shallow Benthamite utilitarianism
involves, in the specification of its object, the mention of other people�s happiness or interests, and so presupposes a reference to other people�s projects (unlike the pursuit of food for myself)
but that would eliminate everything except purely egoistic first-order desires and the one second-order utilitarian project of maximally satisfying first-order projects
utilitarianism: tendency to leave a vast hold between egoistic inclinations + necessities vs impersonally benevolent happiness-management
but modern versions are supposed to be netural with regard to what sorts of things make people happy or what their projects are
the problem is that there are things that make one happy besides making other people happy � vast range of commitments (a person, causes, an institution, career, one�s own genius, the pursuit of danger etc.)
none of these is itself the pursuit of happiness
happiness rather, requires being involved in, or at least content with, something else
not all desires are the desire for pleasure
but Williams says that utilitarianism can accommodate this � by saying that if such commitments are worthwhile, then pursuing the projects that flow from them and realising some of those projects will make the preson for whome they are worthwhile happy
it may be that that is wrong � that a
commitment can make sense of a man�s life without his supposing that it will
make him happy
one has to believe in, or at least want, or quite minimally, be content with, other things, for there to be anywhere that happiness can come from
utilitarianism should agree that its general aim of maximising happiness does not imply that what everyone is doing is just pursuing happiness � on the contrary, people have to be pursuing other things
it may be that those whose commitments are to things outsides themselves are happiest � if so, then utilitarianism will find these out empirically
happy (at the minimum) = less likely to have a breakdown, commit suicide etc.
Smart: struggles with the problem of the brain electrode man
happy is a partly evaluative term, in the sense that �happiness� = those kinds of satisfaction which, as things are, we approve of
but by what standard?
a well-known utilitarian uneasiness: comes from a feeling that it is not respectable to ignore the �deep�, while not having anywhere in human life to locate it � one of the resemblances in spirit between utilitarianism and high-minded evangelical Christianity
the agent as utilitarian: in Jim�s case, our man in South America
his own decisions as a utilitarian are a function of all the satisfactions which he can affect from where he is � and this means that the projects of others, to an indeterminately great extent, determine his decision
if those people weren�t there or had different projects, the causal nexus would be different
it is the actual state of the causal nexus which determines the decision
the utilitarian answer of including your commitments impartially within the calculation is inadequate
the point is not that: if the project/attitude is that important to him then great loss of utility will be involved in the sum
after all: once he is prepared to look at it like that, the argument is basically over
the point is that: this is what his life is about
to ask him to just step aside from his own project/decision, as
calculated by utilitarianism, is to alienate him in a real sense from his
actions and the source of his action in his own convictions
= an attack on his integrity
the utilitarian solution to George�s case would be wrong, seen from this perspective
Jim�s case is different + harder
the utilitarian is probably right, but that is not to be found out just by asking the utilitarian�s questions
the important distinction is between my projects and someone else�s project
humility = as something beyond the real demand of
correct self-appraisal, was specially a Christian virtue, because it involved
subservience to God
the significance of the immediate should not be underestimated
exceedingly good thing: that we are not agents of the universal satisfaction system, not primarily janitors of any system of value, even our own � very often we just act, as a possibly confused result of the situation in which we are engaged
�
�the day cannot be too far off when we hear no more of it [utilitarianism]� � The End
hedonism vs eudaimonism
justice vs integrity
is the principle of impartiality an example of just what Bernard Williams was talking about, re objectivity?:
since morality is metaphysically more objective than a prudential theory, so is it less applicable on the lower level
what�s (the value of) integrity?
what�s the difference/relation between a man�s projects and his actions?
integrity
= the condition of having no part or element taken away
or lacking; undivided state; completeness
the condition of not
being marred or violated; unimpaired or uncorrupted condition; original state;
soundness of moral principle;
the character of uncorrupted virtue; uprightness, honesty, sincerity. m16.